Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts [Bloch, F., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 90-123]. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core [Kóczy, L.Á., 2007. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theory Dec. 63, 41-51].
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994.
"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
- Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
- Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September.
- Chen Ying Huang & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games," Economics Working Papers 0052, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- LÃ¡szlÃ³ KÃ³czy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August.
- Kóczy László Á, 2006. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2003. "Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, May.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
- Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 463-477.
- Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)