Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.54365
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- Kóczy, LászlóÁ., 2015. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 104-110.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," Working Papers 2009.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2012. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 1203, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core," Working Paper Series 0905, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
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Citations
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Cited by:
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- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Maria Montero, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Papers 2021-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
- Greg Leo & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2023. "Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 510-524, June.
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Keywords
Environmental Economics and Policy;JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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