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Traffic Routing Oligopoly

Listed author(s):
  • David Csercsik

    ()

    (P zm ny P‚ter Catholic University Faculty of Information Technology)

  • Balazs Sziklai

    ()

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested networks. Traffic routing has been extensively analyzed from the non-cooperative aspect. A common assumption is that each individual optimizes his route in the network selfishly. However looking at the same network from a different scope in some cases we can find some actors that are responsible for the majority part of the traffic. From the point of view of these actors cooperation is indeed an inherent possibility of the game. Sharing information and cooperation with other agents may result in cost savings, and more efficient utilization of network capacities. Depending on the goal and employed strategy of the agents many possible cooperative games can arise. Our aim is to introduce and analyze these wide variety of transferable utility (TU) games. Since the formation of a coalition may affect other players costs via the implied flow and the resulting edge load changes in the network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in partition function form.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1309.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1309
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  1. Grabisch, Michel & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2012. "A coalition formation value for games in partition function form," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 221(1), pages 175-185.
  2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00690696 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. László Kóczy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August.
  4. Kóczy, László Á., 2009. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 559-565, May.
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