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Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

Author Info

  • László Á. Kóczy

    ()

    (Budapest Tech)

Abstract

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

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File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0801.pdf
File Function: Author's Accepted Manuscript, 2008
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Paper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 0801.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Publication status: Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0801
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Keywords: Core; externalities; sequential coalition formation; order-independent equilibria;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Kóczy László Á, 2006. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September.
  3. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
  4. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2003. "Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, May.
  5. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  6. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
  8. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
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Cited by:

  1. Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  2. László Á. Kóczy & Dávid Csercsik, 2011. "Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks," Working Paper Series 1103, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  3. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.

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