A Simple Noncooperative Core Story
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- Roberto Serrano, 2005.
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- Kóczy Lászlo Á., 2006. "Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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- Evans, Robert, 1997. "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 211-220, May.
- Evans,R., 1995. "Coalition Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9539, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Kóczy László Á., 2008. "Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core," Research Memorandum 028, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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