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Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation

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  • Peyton Young, H.

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  • Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:213-228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
    2. Perez-Castrillo J. David, 1994. "Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 428-440, November.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1985. "Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 757-765, July.
    4. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    5. Brown,Stephen J. & Sibley,David Sumner, 1986. "The Theory of Public Utility Pricing," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314008.
    6. Akira Okada & Eyal Winter, 2002. "A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 1-28, August.
    7. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    8. Baumol, William J & Bradford, David F, 1970. "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 265-283, June.
    9. Kalai, Ehud & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1979. "A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 13-22, February.
    10. Leonard J. Mirman & Yair Tauman, 1982. "Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 40-56, February.
    11. Louis J. Billera & David C. Heath, 1982. "Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 32-39, February.
    12. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
    13. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/06, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    2. R. Brânzei & E. Iñarra & S. Tijs & J. M. Zarzuelo, 2005. "Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(4), pages 623-640, October.
    3. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2023. "An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 88-104.
    4. M. Koster & H. Reijnierse & M. Voorneveld, 2003. "Voluntary Contributions to Multiple Public Projects," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 25-50, January.
    5. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020. "Trouble Comes in Threes: Core stability in Minimum Cost Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper 2020/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    6. Tommy Andersson, 2007. "Non‐Linear Pricing As A Cooperative Game," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 503-513, November.
    7. Koster, M.A.L. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects," Other publications TiSEM aec6651a-5174-4670-ae62-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdait, 2010. "Quasicontinuity and Nash Equilibrium in Compact and Convex Games," Working Papers 2010-ECO-09, IESEG School of Management.
    9. Andersson, Tommy, 2004. "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare," MPRA Paper 59446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2010. "Strategyproof Nash Equilibria in Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Models," MSAP Working Paper Series 01_2010, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    11. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2012. "Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(3), pages 566-570.

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