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Quasicontinuity and Nash Equilibrium in Compact and Convex Games

Author

Listed:
  • Rabia Nessah

    (IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS))

  • Tarik Tazdait

    (CNRS-EHESS-CIRED)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdait, 2010. "Quasicontinuity and Nash Equilibrium in Compact and Convex Games," Working Papers 2010-ECO-09, IESEG School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ies:wpaper:e201009
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Voorneveld & Peter Borm & Freek Van Megen & Stef Tijs & Giovanni Facchini, 1999. "Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 283-299.
    2. Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235, Elsevier.
    3. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1999. "On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 353-364, January.
    4. Guoqiang Tian, 1999. "Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 689-707.
    5. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
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