IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/metroe/v58y2007i4p503-513.html

Non‐Linear Pricing As A Cooperative Game

Author

Listed:
  • Tommy Andersson

Abstract

This paper characterizes non‐linear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus‐sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non‐empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy‐free core to be non‐empty.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson, 2007. "Non‐Linear Pricing As A Cooperative Game," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 503-513, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:503-513
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00284.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00284.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00284.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 1996. "Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-251, April.
    3. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
    4. John R. Sorenson & John T. Tschirhart & Andrew B. Whinston, 1976. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Peak Load Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 497-520, Autumn.
    5. Philippe Bernard & Jerome Wittwer, 2002. "Two-part Pricing, Public Discriminating Monopoly and Redistribution: A Note," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 139-151, May.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1694 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Andersson, Tommy, 2005. "Profit maximizing nonlinear pricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 135-139, July.
    8. Sorenson, John R & Tschirhart, John T & Whinston, Andrew B, 1978. "A Theory of Pricing under Decreasing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 614-624, September.
    9. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andersson, Tommy, 2004. "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare," MPRA Paper 59446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kimmo Berg, 2013. "Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 206(1), pages 23-37, July.
    3. Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2008. "Diagnosing Efficiency of Distortion in Discrete Screening," EERC Working Paper Series 08/02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    4. Ram Orzach & Miron Stano, 2025. "Quantity Discount or Small Quantity Premium? Violating the Single-Crossing Condition," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 67(1), pages 55-67, June.
    5. Andersson, Tommy, 2005. "Nonlinear Pricing and the Utility Possibility Set," Working Papers 2005:19, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
    7. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597, September.
    9. Tian Xia & Richard Sexton, 2010. "Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(4), pages 333-349, June.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
    11. Veiga, André, 2018. "A note on how to sell a network good," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 114-126.
    12. Yao Luo & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2018. "Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(6), pages 2523-2568.
    13. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2013. "Image concerns and the provision of quality," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-211, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    14. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    15. Soheil Ghili & K. Sudhir & Nitish Jain & Ankur Garg, 2025. "Second-degree Price Discrimination: Theoretical Analysis, Experiment Design, and Empirical Estimation," Papers 2507.13426, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    16. Jadbabaie, Ali & Kakhbod, Ali, 2019. "Optimal contracting in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1094-1153.
    17. Haowen Deng & Yifan Dou & Zenan Wu & Cheng Zhang, 2025. "Player-vs.-Player Game Design and Pricing: A Tournament Design Perspective," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 1461-1477, September.
    18. Chih-yi Chi, Woody & Wu, Shufen, 2006. "Intertemporal quality discrimination of a durable good monopolist," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 184-191, August.
    19. Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore & Reisinger, Markus, 2021. "Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    20. Panagiotis Kyriazis & Edmund Lou, 2026. "Information Intermediaries in Monopolistic Screening," Papers 2604.09343, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:503-513. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0026-1386 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.