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H. Peyton Young

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First Name:H.
Middle Name:Peyton
Last Name:Young
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RePEc Short-ID:pyo43
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Homepage:http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/young
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Location: Oxford, United Kingdom
Homepage: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
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Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Handle: RePEc:edi:sfeixuk (more details at EDIRC)
Location: Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
Homepage: http://www.brook.edu/
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Postal: 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036-2188
Handle: RePEc:edi:brookus (more details at EDIRC)
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  1. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Heinrich H. Nax & Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew & Stuart A. West & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "Learning in a Black Box," PSE Working Papers hal-00817201, HAL.
  3. H Peyton Young & Paul Glasserman, 2013. "How Likely is Contagion in Financial Networks?," Economics Series Working Papers 642, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. H Peyton Young & Gabriel E. Kreindler, 2012. "Rapid Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks," Economics Series Working Papers 626, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. H Peyton Young & Thomas Noe, 2012. "The Limits to Compensation in the Financial Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 635, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster, 2011. "A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns," Economics Series Working Papers 567, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster and Robert Stine, 2011. "A Markov Test for Alpha," Economics Series Working Papers 568, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. H Peyton Young & Gabriel E. Kreindler, 2011. "Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series Working Papers 569, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. H Peyton Young & Jason R. Marden and Lucy Y. Pao, 2011. "Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 557, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. H Peyton Young & Bary S. R. Pradelski, 2010. "Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems," Economics Series Working Papers 480, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  13. Peyton Young & Dean Foster, 2010. "Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run," Levine's Working Paper Archive 494, David K. Levine.
  14. Peyton Young & Dean P Foster, 2008. "The Hedge Fund Game," Economics Papers 2008-W01, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  15. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 304, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. H. Peyton Young, 2007. "Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 307, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  17. Dean P Foster & Peyton Young, 2006. "Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000676, David K. Levine.
  18. Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  19. Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2001. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Working Papers 01-08-039, Santa Fe Institute.
  20. H Peyton Young, 2000. "The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks," Economics Working Paper Archive 437, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  21. Axtell, R. & Epstein, J.M. & Young, H.P., 2000. "The Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining Model," Papers 9, Brookings Institution - Working Papers.
  22. Young, H.P., 1999. "Diffusion in Social Networks," Papers 2, Brookings Institution - Working Papers.
  23. Y.M. Kaniovski & A.V. Kryazhimskii & H.P. Young, 1997. "Learning Equilibria in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations," Working Papers ir97017, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
  24. Martin Shubik & H. Peyton Young, 1978. "The Nucleolus as a Noncooperative Game Solution," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 478, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  25. Dean Foster & Peyton Young, . "Learning with Hazy Beliefs," ELSE working papers 023, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  26. Robert Axtell, Joshua M. Epstein, & H. Peyton Young, . "The Emergence of Economic Classes in an Agent-based Bargaining Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 61, Society for Computational Economics.
  1. Kreindler, Gabriel E. & Young, H. Peyton, 2013. "Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 39-67.
  2. Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton, 2012. "Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 882-897.
  3. Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2012. "A strategy-proof test of portfolio returns," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 671-683, March.
  4. Young, H. Peyton, 2011. "Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 12-13, January.
  5. Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2010. "Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1435-1458, November.
  6. H. Peyton Young, 2009. "Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1899-1924, December.
  7. Young, H. Peyton, 2009. "Learning by trial and error," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 626-643, March.
  8. Foster Dean P. & Young H. Peyton, 2008. "Hedge Fund Wizards," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-3, February.
  9. Peyton Young, H., 2008. "Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 382-382, November.
  10. Young, H. Peyton, 2007. "Ken Binmore, Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory, Oxford University Press (2007) ISBN 978-0-19-530057-4 639 pp," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 411-412, May.
  11. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2006. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 341-367, September.
  12. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
  13. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
  14. Young, H. Peyton, 2002. "On the limits to rational learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 791-799, May.
  15. H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
  16. Kaniovski, Yuri M. & Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V. & Young, H. Peyton, 2000. "Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 50-96, April.
  17. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.
  18. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Social norms and economic welfare1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 821-830, May.
  19. Young, H Peyton, 1998. "Conventional Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 773-92, October.
  20. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
  21. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
  22. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
  23. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  24. Sigmund Karl & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Introduction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 103-110, November.
  25. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  26. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  27. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  28. Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean, 1991. "Cooperation in the long-run," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 145-156, February.
  29. Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March.
  30. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  31. Young, H. P., 1987. "Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 203-214, March.
  32. Young, H Peyton, 1985. "Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 757-65, July.
  33. M. L. BALINSKI & H. P. young, 1982. "Fair Representation in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 361-373, 06.
  34. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
  35. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
  36. Young, H Peyton, 1974. "A Note on Preference Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1129-31, November.
  37. Balinski, M. L. & Young, H. P., 1974. "Interpreting von neumann model prices as marginal values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 449-463, December.
  1. Young, H. Peyton, 2006. "Social Dynamics: TheorY AND Applications," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1081-1108 Elsevier.
  2. Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235 Elsevier.
  1. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181.
  2. Steven N. Durlauf & H. Peyton Young (ed.), 2004. "Social Dynamics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262541769, June.
18 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2013-03-09
  2. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2013-03-09
  3. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (3) 2007-04-14 2007-04-14 2013-05-05
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2013-03-09
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2013-02-03 2013-05-05
  6. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (2) 2011-10-09 2011-10-09
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (7) 2001-09-26 2007-04-14 2010-04-17 2011-10-09 2011-10-09 2013-05-05 2014-12-03. Author is listed
  8. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2013-05-05
  9. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (1) 2008-03-25
  10. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (8) 2006-03-18 2007-04-14 2011-07-21 2011-10-09 2011-10-09 2012-11-11 2013-05-05 2013-06-16. Author is listed
  11. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (3) 2007-04-14 2013-05-05 2014-12-03
  12. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2013-02-03
  13. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2012-11-11
  14. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2012-11-11
  15. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2007-04-14
  16. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2006-03-18 2013-05-05
  17. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2012-11-11
  18. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2014-12-03
  19. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2011-10-09 2013-03-09
  20. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (2) 2007-04-14 2014-12-03
  21. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (1) 2012-11-11
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