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Regret Testing Leads to Nash Equilibrium

  • Dean P Foster
  • Peyton Young

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/regretnash.pdf
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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 784828000000000676.

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Date of creation: 02 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000676
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
  2. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October.
  3. Bendor Jonathan & Mookherjee Dilip & Ray Debraj, 2001. "Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, March.
  4. Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2001. "On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents," Working Papers 01-08-039, Santa Fe Institute.
  5. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
  6. Debraj Ray & Dilip Mookherjee & Fernando Vega Redondo & Rajeeva L. Karandikar, 1996. "Evolving aspirations and cooperation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 2000. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 921-50, November.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Scholarly Articles 3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2006. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 286-303, November.
  10. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2001. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May.
  11. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  12. John H. Nachbar, 2005. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, 03.
  13. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  14. Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  15. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  17. Germano, Fabrizio & Lugosi, Gabor, 2007. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July.
  18. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
  19. Amotz Cahn, 2004. "General procedures leading to correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 21-40, January.
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