Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations
This article considers a simple model of reinforcement learning. All behavior change derives from the reinforcing or deterring effect of instantaneous payoff experiences. Payoff experiences are reinforcing or deterring depending on whether the paxoff exceeds an aspiration level or falls short of it. Over time, the aspiration level is adjusted toward the actually experienced payoffs. This article shows that aspiration level adjustments may improve the decision maker's long-run performance by preventing him or her from feeling dissatisfied with even the best available strategies. However, such movements also lead to persistent deviations from expected payoff maximization by creating "probability matching" effects. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Volume (Year): 41 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Bendor, J. & Mookherjee, D. & Ray, D., 1994.
"Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Reapeted Games,"
27, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Bendor, J. & Mookherjee, D. & Ray, D., 1994. "Aspirations, adaptive learning and cooperation in repeated games," Discussion Paper 1994-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1993.
1039, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
- Debraj Ray & Dilip Mookherjee & Fernando Vega Redondo & Rajeeva L. Karandikar, 1996.
"Evolving aspirations and cooperation,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1996-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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