The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks
We consider processes in which new technologies and forms of behavior are transmitted through social and geographic networks Agents adopt behaviors based on a combination of their inherent payoff and their local popularity (the number of neighbors who have adopted them) subject to some random error We characterize the long-run dynamics of such processes in terms of the geometry of the network but without placing a priori restrictions on the network structure When agents interact in sufficiently small close-knit groups the expected waiting time until almost everyone is playing the stochastically stable equilibrium is bounded above independently of the number of agents and independently of the initial state
|Date of creation:||May 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.econ.jhu.edu
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:437. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (None)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask None to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.