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Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion

Author

Listed:
  • Istrate, Gabriel
  • Marathe, Madhav V.
  • Ravi, S.S.

Abstract

In (Istrate et al. SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms . In particular, our main result incorporates contagion into Peyton Young's model.

Suggested Citation

  • Istrate, Gabriel & Marathe, Madhav V. & Ravi, S.S., 2008. "Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion," MPRA Paper 8170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8170
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8170/1/MPRA_paper_8170.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    2. H Peyton Young, 2000. "The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks," Economics Working Paper Archive 437, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary games; stochastic stability; adversarial scheduling;

    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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