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Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks

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  • Lelarge, Marc

Abstract

The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individualsʼ behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination game with binary choice and give a condition for a new action to become widespread in a random network. We also analyze the possible equilibria of this game and identify conditions for the coexistence of both strategies in large connected sets. Finally we look at how can firms use social networks to promote their goals with limited information. Our results differ strongly from the one derived with epidemic models and show that connectivity plays an ambiguous role: while it allows the diffusion to spread, when the network is highly connected, the diffusion is also limited by high-degree nodes which are very stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Lelarge, Marc, 2012. "Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 752-775.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:752-775
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.009
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    Cited by:

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    2. Chellig, Jordan & Durbac, Calina & Fountoulakis, Nikolaos, 2022. "Best response dynamics on random graphs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 141-170.
    3. Ascensión Andina-Díaz & José A. García-Martínez & Antonio Parravano, 2019. "The market for scoops: a dynamic approach," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 175-206, June.
    4. Hamed Amini & Andreea Minca, 2014. "Inhomogeneous Financial Networks and Contagious Links," Working Papers hal-01081559, HAL.
    5. Hamed Amini & Andreea Minca, 2016. "Inhomogeneous Financial Networks and Contagious Links," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 1109-1120, October.
    6. Côme Billard, 2020. "Technology Contagion in Networks," Working Papers 2020.01, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    7. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi & Ogisu, Yoshitaka & Onaga, Tomokatsu, 2023. "Unstable diffusion in social networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    8. Azomahou, T. & Opolot, D., 2014. "Stability and strategic diffusion in networks," MERIT Working Papers 2014-035, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    9. Hüseyin İkizler, 2019. "Contagion of network products in small-world networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(4), pages 789-809, December.
    10. Erol, Selman & Parise, Francesca & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2023. "Contagion in graphons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    11. Teruyoshi Kobayashi & Tomokatsu Onaga, 2023. "Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(1), pages 251-287, July.
    12. Hamed Amini, 2023. "Contagion risks and security investment in directed networks," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, volume 17, number 5, June.
    13. Hamed Amini & Andreea Minca, 2022. "Epidemic Spreading and Equilibrium Social Distancing in Heterogeneous Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 258-287, March.
    14. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social networks; Diffusion; Random graphs; Empirical distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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