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Network Games

Author Info

  • Andrea Galeotti
  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 218-244

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:218-244
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
  • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
  • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification

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  1. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521857406, November.
  2. Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2007. "Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 339-360, May.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Yariv, Leeat, 2006. "Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games," Working Papers 1264, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Leo K. Simon & Jeroen M. Swinkels & William R. Zame, 2002. "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1711-1740, September.
  5. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2005. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000586, www.najecon.org.
  6. Arun Sundararajan, 2004. "Local Network Effects and Network Structure," Industrial Organization 0412011, EconWPA.
  7. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521674096, November.
  8. Foster, Andrew D & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1995. "Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1176-1209, December.
  9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
  10. Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2004. "Who's Who in Crime Networks: Wanted - The Key Player," CEPR Discussion Papers 4421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, 03.
  12. Galeotti, Andrea & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Strategic analysis in complex networks with local externalities," Working Papers 1224, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  13. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 5026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  15. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
  16. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers, 2007. "Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random Are Social Networks?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 890-915, June.
  17. Topa, Giorgio, 1997. "Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment," Working Papers 97-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  18. Galeotti, Andrea, 2005. "Consumers networks and search equilibria," Working Papers 1225, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  19. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16.
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