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Network Games

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Galeotti
  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:218-244
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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