Diffusion in complex social networks
This paper studies how a behavior spreads in a population. We consider a network of interacting agents whose actions are determined by the actions of their neighbors, according to a simple diffusion rule. We find, using a mean-field approach, the threshold for the spreading rate above which the behavior spreads and becomes persistent in the population. This threshold crucially depends on the connectivity distribution of the social network and on specific features of the diffusion rule.
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