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Market Coordination Under Non-Equilibrium Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Arnaud Z. Dragicevic

    (IRSTEA — The Center of Clermont-Ferrand
    Université Clermont Auvergne, VetAgro Sup [UMR Territoires]
    Istanbul Technical University)

Abstract

In order to study the market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics, such as the one outlined in catallactics, we consider a multi-agent system with fixed topology, based upon a Hamiltonian structure, subject to flocking behavior. The assumptions of market segmentation and of imperfect competition are introduced. We show that the catallactic framework leads to the emergence of a stable market coordination, but is also a dissipative structure of cyclical nature, such that imperfect competition gives rise to a pseudo-competitive market. In case of risk-sharing, we find that catallactics yields an unstable trading system, which transforms the market risk into a systemic risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnaud Z. Dragicevic, 2019. "Market Coordination Under Non-Equilibrium Dynamics," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 697-715, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:netspa:v:19:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11067-018-9414-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11067-018-9414-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic, 2022. "Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, December.

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