Cooperative Games with Externalities and Probabilistic Coalitional Beliefs
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More about this item
Keywordsaggregative game; cooperative game; core; stochastic dominance;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-01-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2017-01-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2017-01-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2017-01-22 (Microeconomics)
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