A recursive core for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, June.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997.
"The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., 1997. "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Albizuri, M.J. & Aurrecoechea, J. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2006. "Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-17, October.
- Messan Agbaglah, 2017.
"Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 435-459, March.
- Messan Agbaglah & Lars Ehlers, 2010. "Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks," Working Papers 2010.116, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Messan Agbaglah, 2014. "Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks," Cahiers de recherche 14-02, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
- Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2003. "Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 196-213, May.
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee, 2006. "Coalition Theory and its Applications: A Survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(509), pages 136-155, February.
- Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
More about this item
KeywordsOverlapping coalitions; Cover function game; Recursive core; Residual game; Optimistic; Pessimistic; Efficiency.;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-11-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2014-11-22 (Game Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:shr:wpaper:14-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luc Savard). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deushca.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.