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Core existence in vertically differentiated markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jean J. GABSZEWICZ
  • Marco A. MARINI
  • Ornella TAROLA

Abstract

We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equispaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jean J. GABSZEWICZ & Marco A. MARINI & Ornella TAROLA, 2016. "Core existence in vertically differentiated markets," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2847, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2847
    Note: In : Economics Letters, 149, 28-32, 2016
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2017. "Vertical differentiation and collusion: Pruning or proliferation?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 129-139.
    2. Marco A. Marini, 2018. "Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 3, pages 34-56, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2020. "Cartel formation with quality differentiation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 36-50.
    4. Aymeric Lardon, 2019. "On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 421-449, November.
    5. Gabszewicz Jean J. & Marini Marco A. & Tarola Ornella, 2019. "Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-22, January.
    6. Takeda, Kohei & Hosoe, Toyoki & Watanabe, Takayuki & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2018. "Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 73-84.
    7. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Marco A. Marini & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2023. "Random encounters and information diffusion about product quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 348-376, April.
    8. Amit Gayer, 2025. "Monopoly, Multi-Product Quality, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Market Segmentation," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-15, September.
    9. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2018. "Cooperative games with externalities and probabilistic coalitional beliefs," MPRA Paper 92862, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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