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Vertical differentiation and collusion: pruning or proliferation?

Author

Listed:
  • Jean J. GABSZEWICZ
  • Marco A. MARINI
  • Ornella TAROLA

Abstract

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning emerges and, if so, a fighting brand is marketed. We find that it is always more profitable for colluding firms to adopt a pricing strategy such that some variants are withdrawn from the market. Under pruning, these firms commercialize a fighting brand only when facing competitors in a low-end market.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean J. GABSZEWICZ & Marco A. MARINI & Ornella TAROLA, 2017. "Vertical differentiation and collusion: pruning or proliferation?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2850, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2850
    Note: In : Research in Economics, 71, 129-139, 2017
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabszewicz Jean J. & Marini Marco A. & Tarola Ornella, 2019. "Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-22, January.
    2. Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A. & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2020. "Cartel formation with quality differentiation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 36-50.
    3. Stanislav Stoykov & Ivan Kostov, 2023. "Price Competition with Differentiated Products on a Two-Dimensional Plane: The Impact of Partial Cartel on Firms’ Profits and Behavior," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-25, March.
    4. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2016. "Core existence in vertically differentiated markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 28-32.
    5. Marco A. Marini, 2018. "Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 3, pages 34-56, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Amit Gayer, 2025. "Monopoly, Multi-Product Quality, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Market Segmentation," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-15, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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