An equal right solution to the compensation-responsibility dilemma
In a simple model where skills may differ among agents, we propose to giv e them an equal right to the resources, interpreted as including both the technological possibilities and the skill profile. An equal right guarantees to each agent a minimal welfare level which depends only on her preferences. The conflicting objectives of unequal skill compensation and preferences responsability are then partially achieved.
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