Responsibility and Redistribution: the Case of First Best Taxation
In this paper, we suggerst that one plausible view is to keep us responsible for the parts of the consequences that are independent of the factors beyond our control. Within the framework of a first best taxation problem, we present and characterise a redistributive mechanism that both satisfies this interpretation of the ethics of reponsibility and the ethics of compenstaion within a broad class of economic environments.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.|
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bossert W., 1996.
"Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-51, February.
- Bossert, Walter, 1995. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Bossert, W., 1993. "Redistribution Mechanisms Based on Individual Characteristics," Working Papers 9307, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1997. "Balanced egalitarian redistribution of income," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 185-201, June.
- Sprumont, Y., 1995. "Balanced Egalitarian Redistribution of Income," Cahiers de recherche 9521, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Sprumont, Y., 1995. "Balanced Egalitarian Redistribution of Income," Cahiers de recherche 9521, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier.
- Roemer, J.E., 1992. "A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner," Papers 391, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Fleurbaey Marc, 1995. "Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 505-521, April.
- Maurice Salles, 2005. "Social Choice," Post-Print halshs-00337075, HAL.
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(01), pages 25-55, April.
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equality and responsibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 683-689, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)