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Participation and Solidarity in Redistribution Mechanisms

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  • José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez

    () (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Dep. d’Economia and CREIP, Reus, Spain)

  • Josep E. Peris

    () (Universitat d’Alacant, Dep. de Metodes Quantitatius i Teoria Econ`omica, Alacant, Spain)

Abstract

Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on what every individual deserves according to these claims: the so-called minimal rights (O’Neill 1982). A debatable consequence in one of Luttens’ mechanisms is that “the poorest individuals might up with a negative income” (Luttens 2010); that is, this mechanism does not satisfy participation, which turns out to be incompatible with claims feasibility, under Luttens’ assumptions. We present a new solidarity axiom that is compatible both with participation and claims feasibility, and we provide a mechanism satisfying these properties and our new additive solidarity axiom. Moreover, our mechanism satisfies additional properties, as priority, or re spect of minimal rights.

Suggested Citation

  • José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Josep E. Peris, 2015. "Participation and Solidarity in Redistribution Mechanisms," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 036-048, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2015_036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bossert W., 1996. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-51, February.
    2. Bertil Tungodden, 2005. "Responsibility and redistribution: The case of first best taxation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 33-44, June.
    3. IÓigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 1997. "Redistribution and individual characteristics," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 45-55.
    4. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012. "Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591, June.
    5. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 441-443.
    6. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    7. Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1996. "Redistribution and compensation (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(3), pages 343-355.
    8. Roland Luttens, 2010. "Minimal rights based solidarity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 47-64, January.
    9. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    10. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giménez-Gómez, José M. & Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2016. "A `Solidarity' Approach to the Problem of Sharing a Network Cost," QM&ET Working Papers 16-5, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    2. Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Peris, Josep E. & Solís-Baltodano, María-José, 2017. "Resource Allocation with Warranties in Claims Problems," QM&ET Working Papers 17-4, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution mechanism; minimal rights; solidarity; participation; claims feasibility;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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