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A Proposal to Unify Some Concepts in the Theory of Fairness

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  • Corchon, Luis C.
  • Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo

Abstract

So far, the Theory of Distributive Justice has tried to single out a unique criterion of Justice. In our opinion, we live in a world in which different people hold conflicting ideas about justice. We propose a procedure for representing these individual opinions, by means of what we call ``aspiration functions'', and we present in this paper three different ways of aggregating such opposing opinions into a socially acceptable judgement. Furthermore, we show that many well-known concepts are special cases of our approach. We study, under a restriction on the form of the aspiration functions, the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be generated from any of our concepts.
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  • Corchon, Luis C. & Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo, 2001. "A Proposal to Unify Some Concepts in the Theory of Fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 540-571, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:540-571
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    2. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    3. R?bert F. Veszteg, 2004. "Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 613.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Kranich, Laurence, 2015. "Equal shadow wealth: A new concept of fairness in exchange economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 110-117.

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