IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Union games: technological unemployment

  • Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba


  • Emma Moreno-García


Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Pages: 359-373

in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:359-373
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Web:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  2. Safra, Zvi, 1985. "Existence of equilibrium for walrasian endowment games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 366-378, December.
  3. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-90, September.
  4. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
  5. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1998. "The European Unemployment Dilemma," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 514-550, June.
  6. Oswald, Andrew J., 1993. "Efficient contracts are on the labour demand curve : Theory and facts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 85-113, June.
  7. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 354-376, December.
  9. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 1995. "Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 745, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Blanchard, Olivier & Wolfers, Justin, 2000. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C1-33, March.
  11. Codognato, G. & Gabszewicz, J., 1991. "Cournot-Walras equilibria in pure exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1991010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & MICHEL, Philippe, 1992. "Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1992047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. CODOGNATO, Giulio & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J., . "Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January.
  15. Lahmandi-Ayed, R, 1996. "Oligopoly Equilibria in Exchange Economies : Limit Theorems," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 96.07, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  16. Horst Siebert, 1997. "Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 37-54, Summer.
  17. Gregory, R G, 1986. "Wages Policy and Unemployment in Australia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(210(S)), pages S53-74, Supplemen.
  18. Solow, Robert M., 1979. "Another possible source of wage stickiness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 79-82.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:359-373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Christopher F Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.