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Union Games: Technological Unemployment

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Abstract

Given a production economy, we define a trade union game by considering strategic behavior on factor supplies. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as trade union equilibria. First we analyze situations under which unemployment of factors are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. In this line, we suggest a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the related literature. Then, we state a limit result which shows that when the market power of trade unions decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba & Emma Moreno García, 2004. "Union Games: Technological Unemployment," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/45, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_45
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    Cited by:

    1. Fernández-de-Córdoba, Gonzalo & Vázquez, Jesús, 2011. "Unions, monetary shocks and the labour market cycle," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1140-1149, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade Union Games; unemployment; walrasian equilibrium; manipulability.;

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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