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Union Games: Technological Unemployment

Given a production economy, we define a trade union game by considering strategic behavior on factor supplies. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as trade union equilibria. First we analyze situations under which unemployment of factors are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. In this line, we suggest a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the related literature. Then, we state a limit result which shows that when the market power of trade unions decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2004/45.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_45
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  1. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  2. Oswald, A. J., 1995. "Efficient contracts are on the labour demand curve: Theory and facts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 102-102, March.
  3. CODOGNATO, Giulio & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J., . "Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 354-376, December.
  5. Solow, Robert M., 1979. "Another possible source of wage stickiness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 79-82.
  6. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1995. "The European unemployment dilemma," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues 95-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  7. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January.
  8. Safra, Zvi, 1985. "Existence of equilibrium for walrasian endowment games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 366-378, December.
  9. Gregory, R G, 1986. "Wages Policy and Unemployment in Australia," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(210(S)), pages S53-74, Supplemen.
  10. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 1995. "Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 745, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
  12. Olivier Blanchard & Justin Wolfers, 1999. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gabszewicz, J.J. & Michel, P., . "Oligopoly equilibrium in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1265, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Lahmandi-Ayed, R, 1996. "Oligopoly Equilibria in Exchange Economies : Limit Theorems," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 96.07, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  15. Horst Siebert, 1997. "Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 37-54, Summer.
  16. Codognato, G. & Gabszewicz, J., 1991. "Cournot-Walras equilibria in pure exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1991010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  18. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-90, September.
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