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Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: a closed form solution

Author

Listed:
  • Rajat Deb

    (Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tx 75275, USA)

  • Tae Kun Seo

    (Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tx 75275, USA)

Abstract

The paper derives a closed form solution for the maximal surplus generated by the pivotal mechanism in the case of a binary public good. The formula may be used to compare the pivotal mechanism to other mechanisms. An illustration is provided to demonstrate how such a comparison may be made.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajat Deb & Tae Kun Seo, 1998. "Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: a closed form solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(4), pages 347-357.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:347-357
    Note: Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 16 June 1998
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Voting and optimal provision of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 35-41.
    2. Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
    3. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
    4. Yi, Jianxin & Li, Yong, 2016. "A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 79-86.
    5. You, Jung S., 2015. "Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 166-190.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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