Monopoly Sale of a Network Good
This paper studies the problem of a monopolist who sells a network good through a price posting scheme. The scheme posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer, who are then asked to report their private information to the seller. The seller then implements the allocation based on the reports. The social choice functions that are ex post implementable through such a sales scheme are characterized, and the conditions are identified under which the revenue maximizing scheme has the property that the price of a larger network is more affordable than that of a smaller network.
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- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010.
"Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
- Park In-Uck, 2004. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, June.
- In-Uck Park, 2003. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/085, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 123-138, March.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Winter, Eyal, 1999. "Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 72-94, July.
- Arun Sundararajan, 2004. "Local Network Effects and Network Structure," Industrial Organization 0412011, EconWPA. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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