A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
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- In-Uck Park, 2003. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/085, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dybvig, Philip H. & Spatt, Chester S., 1983. "Adoption externalities as public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-247, March.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 2000.
"Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project,"
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- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, "undated". "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, "undated". ""Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project''," CARESS Working Papres 99-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 1997. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Discussion Papers 1188, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gradstein, Mark, 1992. "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 581-597, June.
- Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:pit:wpaper:233 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010.
"Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
- Shichijo Tatsuhiro & Nakayama Yuji, 2009. "A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20, February.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Monopoly Sale of a Network Good," ISER Discussion Paper 0794, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- In-Uck Park, 2004. "Dynamic Formation of Network with Adoption Externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 662, Econometric Society.
More about this item
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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