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An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies

  • Katsuhiko Nishizaki

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

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    This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely implementable over the domains that satisfy partial dominance introduced in this paper. Partial dominance is a reasonable condition because the set of all strictly increasing and strictly concave valuation functions satisfies this condition.

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P29.pdf
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    Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 300-308

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    Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00797
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    1. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 123-138, March.
    2. Ohseto, Shinji, 2000. "Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-66, July.
    3. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2008. "Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 91-95, July.
    4. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
    5. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura & Seo, Tae Kun, 2003. "Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 205-227, April.
    6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1987. "On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 382-386, August.
    7. Yan Yu, 2007. "Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 539-555, October.
    8. Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiho, 2003. "Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?," Working Papers 1165, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    9. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2008. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 2008-7, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    10. Kumar, Rajnish, 2013. "Secure implementation in production economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 372-378.
    11. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2010. "Secure implementation in allotment economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-49, January.
    12. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
    13. Shinji Ohseto, 2005. "Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 589-606, October.
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