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Listed:
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Louis Putterman
  • Victor Naroditskiy
  • Maria Polukarov
  • Amy Greenwald
  • Nicholas R. Jennings

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n > m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant{strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be burnt to support dominant{strategy implementation. Recent work modified the classic VCG mechanism by redistributing as much of the payments as possible back to the agents while still satisfying incentive constraints. This approach guarantees allocative efficiency, but in some cases a large percentage of social welfare is lost. In this paper, we provide a mechanism that is not allocatively efficient but is instead guaranteed to achieve at least 80% of the social welfare as n ! 1. Moreover, in the extreme case of m = n ?? 1 where VCG{based mechanisms provide zero welfare, the percentage of social welfare maintained by our mechanism asymptotically approaches 100%.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffroy de Clippel & Louis Putterman & Victor Naroditskiy & Maria Polukarov & Amy Greenwald & Nicholas R. Jennings, 2012. "Destroy to Save," Working Papers 2012-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
    2. Nisan,Noam & Roughgarden,Tim & Tardos,Eva & Vazirani,Vijay V. (ed.), 2007. "Algorithmic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872829.
    3. Bailey, Martin J, 1997. "The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 107-126, April.
    4. Guo, Mingyu & Conitzer, Vincent, 2009. "Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 69-98, September.
    5. Porter, Ryan & Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Fair imposition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 209-228, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sprumont, Yves, 2013. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1102-1121.
    2. Yan Long, 2020. "Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 467-502, September.
    3. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0931, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. Naroditskiy, Victor & Steinberg, Richard, 2015. "Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 24-41.
    5. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2015. "Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 169-181.
    6. Athanasiou, Efthymios, 2013. "A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 369-387.
    7. Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Optimal allocation of an indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.

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