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References listed on IDEAS
- Nisan,Noam & Roughgarden,Tim & Tardos,Eva & Vazirani,Vijay V. (ed.), 2007. "Algorithmic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872829, March.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sprumont, Yves, 2013.
"Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1102-1121.
- Yves Sprumont, 2011. "Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche 14-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- SPRUMONT, Yves, 2011. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche 2011-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0931, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Naroditskiy, Victor & Steinberg, Richard, 2015. "Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 24-41.
- Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2015. "Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 169-181.
- Athanasiou, Efthymios, 2013. "A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 369-387.
More about this item
KeywordsRedistribution mechanisms; Budget balance; Inefficient allocation;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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