Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
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References listed on IDEAS
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
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- Robin Lindsey & André De Palma & Hugo Silva, 2018. "Equilibrium in a dynamic model of congestion with large and small users," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01760135, HAL.
More about this item
Keywordsredistribution mechanisms; congestion; VCG;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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