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A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation

Listed author(s):
  • Choi, Jaewon
  • Kim, Taesung
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(98)90663-7
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 27 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 64-85

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:1:p:64-85
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    1. Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
    4. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium," Working Papers 532, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    6. Ledyard, John O., 1978. "Incentive compatibility and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 171-189, June.
    7. Williams, Steven R, 1986. "Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 139-151, January.
    8. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-691, June.
    9. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
    10. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Implementing just and efficient decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 193-213, October.
    11. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
    12. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
    13. H. Moulin, 1984. "The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 157-170.
    14. Stefan Reichelstein & Stanley Reiter, 1985. "Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces," Discussion Papers 663, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    15. Matthew Jackson & Herve Moulin, 1990. "Implementing A Public Project and Distributing Its Costs," Discussion Papers 882, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
    17. Hagerty, Kathleen M. & Rogerson, William P., 1987. "Robust trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 94-107, June.
    18. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
    19. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
    20. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
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