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Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces

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  • Stefan Reichelstein
  • Stanley Reiter

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  • Stefan Reichelstein & Stanley Reiter, 1985. "Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces," Discussion Papers 663, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:663
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/663.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    5. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August.
    6. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 381-392.
    7. Leamer, Edward E, 1981. "Is It a Demand Curve, or Is It a Supply Curve? Partial Identification through Inequality Constraints," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 319-327.
    8. Moore, John, 1984. "Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1523-1535, November.
    9. Hu, Audrey & Matthews, Steven A. & Zou, Liang, 2010. "Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1188-1202, May.
    10. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    11. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 655-708.
    3. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 33-68.
    4. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    5. Tian, Guoqiang & Li, Qi, 1995. "Ratio-Lindahl equilibria and an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership system," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 391-411, May.
    6. Choi, Jaewon & Kim, Taesung, 1999. "A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 64-85, April.
    7. Guoqiang Tian, 2006. "The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 155-182, January.
    8. Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March.
    9. Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 163-184.
    10. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 1-31.
    11. Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.

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