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Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies

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  • Marschak, Thomas
  • Reichelstein, Stefan

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  • Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:1:p:106-141
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    4. Nahum Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 257-289, June.
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    7. Stefan Reichelstein & Stanley Reiter, 1985. "Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces," Discussion Papers 663, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Geanakoplos, John & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 205-225, September.
    9. Walker, Mark, 1977. "On the informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 366-375, August.
    10. Mount, Kenneth & Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "The informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 161-192, June.
    11. Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1983. "On the Existence of a Locally Stable Dynamic Process With a Statically Minimal Message Space," Discussion Papers 550, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. E. Malinvaud, 1971. "A Planning Approach to the Public Good Problem," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Peter Bohm & Allen V. Kneese (ed.), The Economics of Environment, pages 77-93, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
    14. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Hierarchical Regulatory Control," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 369-383, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
    2. Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Sunil Dutta & Stefan J. Reichelstein, 2019. "Capacity Rights and Full Cost Transfer Pricing," CESifo Working Paper Series 7968, CESifo.
    4. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian, 2005. "Using disclosure to influence herd behavior and alter competition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 231-246, December.
    5. Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein, 2021. "Capacity Rights and Full-Cost Transfer Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 1303-1325, February.
    6. Hvide, Hans K. & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    8. Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 1094-1129.
    9. Ehsani, Maryam & Makui, Ahmad & Sadi Nezhad, Soheil, 2010. "A methodology for analyzing decision networks, based on information theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(3), pages 853-863, May.
    10. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
    11. Timothy Van Zandt, 1997. "Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation," Discussion Papers 1231, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Stephen J. DeCanio & Catherine Dibble & Keyvan Amir-Atefi, 2000. "The Importance of Organizational Structure for the Adoption of Innovations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(10), pages 1285-1299, October.
    13. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Dilip Mookherjee, 2008. "The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Mechanism Design Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 237-260, June.
    15. Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Economics of leadership and hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 88-106.

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