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Thomas Marschak

Personal Details

First Name:Thomas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Marschak
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RePEc Short-ID:pma832
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Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Walter A. Haas School of Business
University of California-Berkeley

Berkeley, California (United States)
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/

:

545 Student Services Building # 1900, Berkeley, CA 94720-1900
RePEc:edi:habrkus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Marschak, Thomas & Shanthikumar, J. George & Zhou, Junjie, 2017. "Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 104-117.
  2. Thomas Marschak & J. George Shanthikumar & Junjie Zhou, 2015. "A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(1), pages 110-133, January.
  3. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April.
  4. Courtney Dennis & Marschak Thomas, 2006. "Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-34, December.
  5. Thomas Marschak, 2004. "Information Technology and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 473-515, September.
  6. Leonid Hurwicz & Thomas Marschak, 2003. "Comparing finite mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 783-841, June.
  7. Leonid Hurwicz & Thomas Marschak, 2003. "Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate Walrasian versus approximate Direct Revelation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 545-572, March.
  8. Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March.
  9. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
  10. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
  11. Marschak, T A, 1978. "On the Study of Taste Changing Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 386-391, May.
  12. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.
  13. Marschak, Thomas, 1977. "Welfare Economics: Discussion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 240-242, February.
  14. Marschak, Thomas, 1969. "On the Comparison of Centralized and Decentralized Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 525-532, May.
  15. Thomas A. Marschak, 1968. "Centralized Versus Decentralized Resource Allocation: The Yugoslav "Laboratory"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 561-587.
  16. T. A. Marschak & J. A. Yahav, 1966. "The Sequential Selection of Approaches to a Task," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(9), pages 627-647, May.
  17. Thomas Marschak, 1959. "Capital Budgeting and Pricing in the French Nationalized Industries," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33, pages 133-133.

Chapters

  1. Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics,in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440 Elsevier.
  2. Thomas A. Marschak, 1962. "Strategy and Organization in a System Development Project," NBER Chapters,in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 509-548 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Garicano, Luis & Prat, Andrea, 2011. "Organizational Economics with Cognitive Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 8372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Thomas Marschak & J. George Shanthikumar & Junjie Zhou, 2015. "A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(1), pages 110-133, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Begen, Mehmet A. & Pun, Hubert & Yan, Xinghao, 2016. "Supply and demand uncertainty reduction efforts and cost comparison," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 125-134.
    2. Marschak, Thomas & Shanthikumar, J. George & Zhou, Junjie, 2017. "Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 104-117.

  2. Courtney Dennis & Marschak Thomas, 2006. "Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-34, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April.
    2. Bogumił Kamiński & Maciej Łatek, 2010. "Tradeoff between Equity and Effciency in Revenue Sharing Contracts," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, CEJEME, vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, January.

  3. Thomas Marschak, 2004. "Information Technology and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 473-515, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Yanfei & Yao, Shuntian & Chia, Wai-Mun, 2009. "Endogenous Firm and Information Rent Under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13506, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2009.
    2. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Leonid Hurwicz & Thomas Marschak, 2003. "Comparing finite mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 783-841, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
    2. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Leonid Hurwicz & Thomas Marschak, 2003. "Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate Walrasian versus approximate Direct Revelation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 545-572, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
    2. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  6. Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
    2. Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, EconWPA.
    4. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
    5. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    6. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian, 2005. "Using disclosure to influence herd behavior and alter competition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 231-246, December.
    7. Kirchmaier, Isadora, 2014. "Service Organizations: Customer Contact and Incentives of Knowledge Managers," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100418, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 1094-1129.
    9. Ehsani, Maryam & Makui, Ahmad & Sadi Nezhad, Soheil, 2010. "A methodology for analyzing decision networks, based on information theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(3), pages 853-863, May.
    10. Stephen J. DeCanio & Catherine Dibble & Keyvan Amir-Atefi, 2000. "The Importance of Organizational Structure for the Adoption of Innovations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(10), pages 1285-1299, October.
    11. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Dilip Mookherjee, 2008. "The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Mechanism Design Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 237-260, June.
    13. Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Economics of leadership and hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 88-106.

  7. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    2. Guoqiang Tian, 2006. "The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 155-182, January.
    3. Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
    4. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    5. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  8. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
    2. Timothy Van Zandt & Roy Radner, 1998. "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale," Discussion Papers 1233, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  9. Marschak, T A, 1978. "On the Study of Taste Changing Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 386-391, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Cornell, Laurence D. & Sorenson, Vernon L., 1986. "Implications of Structural Change in U.S. Demand for Meat on U.S. Livestock and Grain Markets," Agricultural Economic Report Series 201355, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
    2. Benteng Zou & Ingmar Schumacher, 2013. "Threshold Preferences and the Environment," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-14, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    3. Lorenz Kueng & Evgeny Yakovlev, 2016. "Long-Run Effects of Public Policies: Endogenous Alcohol Preferences and Life Expectancy in Russia," Working Papers w0219, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    4. Lusk, Jayson L. & Rozan, Anne, 2008. "Public Policy and Endogenous Beliefs: The Case of Genetically Modified Food," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 33(2), August.

  10. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.

    Cited by:

    1. Reinhard Selten, 1998. "Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 1-36, January.
    2. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Joel Guttman & Michael Miller, 1979. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 150, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 1018-1039, December.
    5. Jim Andreoni, "undated". "Do Government Subsidies Affect the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Papers _033, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
    6. Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco A., 2011. "Kinked Norms of Behaviour and Cooperation," MPRA Paper 80519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention," Working Papers 225813, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    8. Farm, Ante, 2009. "Market Sharing and Price Leadership," Working Paper Series 3/2009, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    9. Post, Gerald Vernon, 1983. "Optimal tariffs and retaliation with perfect foresight," ISU General Staff Papers 198301010800009429, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Subir K Chakrabarti, 1987. "Strong, Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of Inertia Supergames," Discussion Papers 716, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    12. Willson, Stephen J., 2000. "Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 323-348, May.
    13. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.

  11. Marschak, Thomas, 1969. "On the Comparison of Centralized and Decentralized Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 525-532, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Lang, N.A. & Moonen, J.M. & Srour, F.J. & Zuidwijk, R.A., 2008. "Multi Agent Systems in Logistics: A Literature and State-of-the-art Review," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2008-043-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

  12. Thomas A. Marschak, 1968. "Centralized Versus Decentralized Resource Allocation: The Yugoslav "Laboratory"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 561-587.

    Cited by:

    1. Bukvić, Rajko, 1999. "Istraživanja tržišnih struktura u privredi druge Jugoslavije
      [Researches of the Market Structures in the Economy of the Former Yugoslavia]
      ," MPRA Paper 73670, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
    2. Yves Simon & Henri Tezenas du Montcel, 1977. "Théorie de la firme et réforme de l'entreprise," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 28(3), pages 321-351.

  13. T. A. Marschak & J. A. Yahav, 1966. "The Sequential Selection of Approaches to a Task," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(9), pages 627-647, May.

    Cited by:

    1. S.D. Deshmukh & S.D.Chikte, 1975. "Optimal Stochastic Development Strategy," Discussion Papers 159, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Chapters

  1. Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics,in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440 Elsevier.

    Cited by:

    1. DeCanio, Stephen J. & Watkins, William E., 1998. "Information processing and organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 275-294, August.
    2. Gilroy, Bernard Michael, 1987. "The role of intra-firm trade," MPRA Paper 18039, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
    4. Roe, Terry L. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1990. "Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium," Bulletins 7483, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.

  2. Thomas A. Marschak, 1962. "Strategy and Organization in a System Development Project," NBER Chapters,in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 509-548 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert Jones & Joseph Ostroy, 1976. "Liquidity as Flexibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 073, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Kevin Boudreau, 2010. "Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(10), pages 1849-1872, October.

More information

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Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

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