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Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly

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  • Joel Guttman

    (UCLA)

  • Michael Miller

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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  • Joel Guttman & Michael Miller, 1979. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 150, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:150
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp150.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.
    3. Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-255, May.
    4. Wassily Leontief, 1936. "Stackelberg on Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(4), pages 554-554.
    5. George J. Stigler, 1947. "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(5), pages 432-432.
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