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Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games

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  • Willson, Stephen J.

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  • Willson, Stephen J., 2000. "Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 323-348, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:39:y:2000:i:3:p:323-348
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1986. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(10), pages 1346-1355, October.
    3. Donald Wittman, 1986. "Final-Offer Arbitration," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1551-1561, December.
    4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    5. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Merrill, Samuel III, 1991. "Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 91-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    6. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Weber, Shlomo, 1989. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 89-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    7. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
    8. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.

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