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Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem

  • Kilgour, D.M.
  • Brams, S.J.

A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem).

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9383/RR96-21.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-21.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-21
Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
  2. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589826 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Dov Samet, 1994. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Game Theory and Information 9408001, EconWPA, revised 17 Aug 1994.
  6. Stuart, Harborne Jr., 1997. "Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 133-143, April.
  7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
  8. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  9. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  11. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589819 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521589833 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November.
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