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Rationality And Stability In The Theory Of Moves

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  • Edwin Woerdman

Abstract

According to Brams' Theory of Moves (TOM), mutual cooperation will emerge in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) from all initial states (except initial state (2,2)). Contrary to this result, only applying the rules of TOM to the PDG (including the precedence norm) yields mutual defection from all initial states (except initial state (3,3)). It appears that TOM achieves the cooperative outcomes by introducing a concept of voluntary cooperation (magnanimity) and an interpretation of self-interest (the Two-Sidedness Convention), which are both based on collective rationality. Specifically, these elements of TOM ignore the conflict between individual and collective rationality, which characterizes the dilemma of the PDG. In addition, the PDG in TOM is not internally stable in the case of uncertainty with regard to the starting point of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Edwin Woerdman, 2000. "Rationality And Stability In The Theory Of Moves," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(1), pages 67-86, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:67-86
    DOI: 10.1177/104346300012001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    2. Daniel G. Arce M., 1996. "Social Norms, Inflation And Stabilization," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(3), pages 277-294, August.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    5. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
    6. Daniel G. Arce M., 1994. "Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(4), pages 749-765, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Mixed Strategies In The Mugging Game," Rationality and Society, , vol. 13(2), pages 205-212, May.
    2. Assaf Meydani & Shlomo Mizrahi, 2010. "The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Parliament in Light of the Theory of Moves: the Case of Israel," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(1), pages 55-82, February.

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