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Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma

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  • Daniel G. Arce M.

    (University of Alabama)

Abstract

This article introduces four criteria for characterizing social norms in both cooperative and noncooperative games. The criteria are hybrids of von Neumann and Morgenstern's notion of stability and Greenberg's theory of social situations. When applied to the three-player prisoner's dilemma, these criteria illustrate that Nash and strong Nash equilibrium behavior do not rule out the possibility of unilateral defection as a social norm. We conclude with a new type of equilibrium behavior that induces coalition building and leads to social norms that rule out unilateral defection and allow for cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel G. Arce M., 1994. "Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(4), pages 749-765, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:4:p:749-765
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038004008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Xiao, 2001. "General systems and [phiv]-stable sets -- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 95-109, November.
    2. Todd Sandler, 1999. "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 727-747, December.
    3. Inarra, Elena & Concepcion Larrea, M. & Saracho, Ana I., 2007. "The supercore for normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 530-538, January.
      • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    4. Daniel Bennett, 2012. "Does Clean Water Make You Dirty?: Water Supply and Sanitation in the Philippines," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(1), pages 146-173.
    5. Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción, 2005. "Admissible Hierachic Sets," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    6. Daniel G. Arce M., 1996. "Social Norms, Inflation And Stabilization," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(3), pages 277-294, August.
    7. Edwin Woerdman, 2000. "Rationality And Stability In The Theory Of Moves," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(1), pages 67-86, February.
    8. Daniel Arce, 1997. "Fiscal Pacts," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 271-284, July.
    9. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2017. "The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 149-166, March.

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