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Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system

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  • Inarra, E.
  • Larrea, C.
  • Saracho, A.

Abstract

In this paper, under a binary relation that refines the standard relation which only accounts for single profitable deviations, we obtain that the set of NE strategy profiles of every finite non-cooperative game in normal form coincides with the supercore (Roth, 1976) of its associated abstract system. Further, under the standard relation we show when these two solution concepts coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • Inarra, E. & Larrea, C. & Saracho, A., 2010. "Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 141-147, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:141-147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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      • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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