Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
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- David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet, 2016. "Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 015231, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Bardey, David & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2016. "Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice," Les Cahiers de Recherche 1184, HEC Paris, revised 16 Jan 2017.
- David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2016. "Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice," PSE Working Papers halshs-01400841, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Winand Emons, 1998. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller," Diskussionsschriften dp9808, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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More about this item
Keywordsasymmetric information; Competition; Expertise; Mis-Selling; regulation; Retailing;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-12-04 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2016-12-04 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2016-12-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2016-12-04 (Regulation)
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