When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target?
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"Too much or too little? Price-discrimination in a market for credence goods,"
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- Silvia Martínez-Gorricho, 2014. "Information and consumer fraud in a signalling model," Working Papers. Serie AD 2014-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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- Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias, 2014. "Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation," Discussion Papers 2014/29, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias, 2014. "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 483, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias, 2014. "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 10254, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jennifer Brown & Dylan Minor, 2015. "Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-022, Harvard Business School.
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- repec:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:35-39 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Ouyang, Yaofu, 2016. "Credence Goods, Risk Averse, and Optimal Insurance," MPRA Paper 70392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Seung Lee, 2013. "Ethics and Expertise: A Social Networks Perspective," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 607-621, December.
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More about this item
KeywordsAsymmetric and Private Information Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility Information;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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