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Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames

Author

Listed:
  • Reinhard Selten

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1994.

Suggested Citation

  • Reinhard Selten, 1994. "Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:1994_003
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    Cited by:

    1. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2004. "Strategic delegation in experimental markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 561-574, April.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2013. "Large extensive form games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 75-102, January.
    3. Vital Anderhub & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke & Hans-Theo Normann, 2003. "Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 27-52, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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