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Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints

Author

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  • Dilip Mookherjee
  • Masatoshi Tsumagari

Abstract

We consider mechanism design in which message sets are restricted owing to communication costs, preventing full revelation of information. A principal contracts with multiple agents each supplying a one-dimensional good at a privately known cost. We characterize optimal mechanisms subject to incentive and communication constraints, without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the number of communication rounds. We show that mechanisms that centralize production decisions are strictly dominated by those that decentralize decision-making authority to agents, and optimal communication mechanisms maximize information exchanged directly among agents. Conditions are provided for these to involve gradual release of information over multiple rounds either simultaneously or sequentially.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 1094-1129.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/676931
    DOI: 10.1086/676931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
    3. Matthieu Bouvard & Bruno Jullien & David Martimort, 2025. "Economics of Procurement and Organizational Design: A review of selected literature," Working Papers hal-05282270, HAL.
    4. Schopohl, Simon, 2016. "Communication games with optional verification," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 569, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. David Kempe, 2019. "Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting," Papers 1911.08129, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
    6. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01490688, HAL.
    7. Ran Eilat & Kfir Eliaz Eliaz & Xiaosheng Mu, 2021. "Bayesian Privacy," Working Papers 2021-65, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    8. Eliaz, Kfir & Eilat, Ran & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2019. "Optimal Privacy-Constrained Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Post-Print halshs-01490688, HAL.
    10. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
    11. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    12. Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2018. "To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 318-329.

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