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Théorie de la firme et réforme de l'entreprise

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  • Yves Simon
  • Henri Tezenas du Montcel

Abstract

[eng] Economic theory and reform of the firm a survey of property rights theory. . It is well known since K. Marx, that the appropriation of the means of production plays a capital part in economies. Though it may take different forms it has nevertheless a variable influence on the form and level of the firm performances. The property rights theory endbles the comparative study of different organisations and the analysis of the managerial behavior. The need to adapt the rigths to improve the firm appears therefore clearly. [fre] On sait depuis Karl Marx que l'appropriation des moyens de production a, en économie, un rôle central. Pouvant obéir à différentes modalités, elle exerce une influence variable sur la forme et le niveau des performances des entreprises. La théorie des droits de propriété permet d'étudier sur des bases homogènes les différents types d'organisation. De la firme capitaliste à la firme autogérée, une approche du comportement des managers est tentée. La nécessité d'aménager les droits pour qui prétend réformer l'entreprise apparaît ainsi clairement.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Simon & Henri Tezenas du Montcel, 1977. "Théorie de la firme et réforme de l'entreprise," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 28(3), pages 321-351.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1977_num_28_3_408326
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1977.408326
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1977.408326
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    Cited by:

    1. François Facchini, 1997. "Gestion des externalités, droit de propriété et responsabilité civile," Post-Print hal-01377930, HAL.

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