Tradeoff between Equity and Effciency in Revenue Sharing Contracts
We investigate the problem of setting revenue sharing rules in a team production environment with a principal and two agents. We assume that the project output is binary and that the principal can observe the level of agents' actual effort, but does not know the production function. Identifying conditions that ensure the eficiency of the revenue sharing rule, we show that the rule of equal percentage markups can lead to inflation of project costs. This result provides an explanation for project cost overruns other than untruthful cost reporting.
Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Susan Gensemer & Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, 2004. "Alliances and cost declaration," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 121-136.
- Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Roland Strausz, "undated". "Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams," Papers 001, Departmental Working Papers.
- Courtney Dennis & Marschak Thomas, 2006. "Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-34, December.
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